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I.

INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum discusses whether the test of fitness to plead is the same during the

appeal process as in the trial process at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(“ECCC”).* This memorandum provides a brief analysis on the fitness standard used at the trial
level, and policy considerations for why a different, more flexible test should be used at the
appellate level. In addition, this memorandum provides a brief insight into other, similar civil
law jurisdictions and how these courts have handled related issues.
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. The trial level court used a specific standard of fitness.
The ECCC trial level used different, more strict standard to determine if the accused was
fit to stand trial at the trial level, than that which should be used on the appellate level. This
standard, applied directly, would not be appropriate to apply to the current, ongoing appeals in
the ECCC.
ii. There seems to be an international trend towards using a more
flexible standard of fitness on appeal.
While there is not a well-established international rule for a differentiating standard for
fitness, there arguably seems to be an international trend towards using a less strict standard
during the appeal process than during the trial process.

*

Is the test of fitness to plead the same during the appeal process as the trial process at the
ECCC?

7

iii. Using a more flexible standard of fitness would be appropriate for
cases currently awaiting judgment on appeal.
Even though there are other potential remedies against an accused who has been found
unfit to plead and stand trial, using a less strict standard of fitness at the appellate level would be
the most appropriate avenue.
II.

BACKGROUND
Under Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the ECCC Statute, the Extraordinary Chambers were created

to prosecute all Suspects who either committed or ordered crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, associated with the
Democratic Kampuchea.1 These crimes must have occurred between April 17, 1975, and January
6, 1979.2 The ECCC also has jurisdiction to prosecute all Suspects “most responsible for the
destruction of cultural property” and “most responsible for crimes against internationally
protected persons” that occurred in connection with the armed conflict, during the same specified
time frame.3
On January 15, 2014, two of the accused filed written for the Chamber to review their
fitness to stand trial.4 While these two accused have since been deemed fit to stand trial and have

1

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006) [reproduced on accompanying flash
drive at number 9].
2

Id. at Article 1.

3

Id. at Article 7-8.

4

Decision on Fitness of the Accused Khieu Samphan to Stand Trial, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC,
1 (24 April 2014); and Decision on Fitness of Accused Nuon Chea to Stand Trial, 002/19-092007/ECCC/TC, 1 (24 April 2014) [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at numbers 4 and 5,
respectively].
8

been sentenced to life imprisonment at the trial level,5 both men are of a certain age where there
may be a question as to whether either of them will still be considered fit to stand trial through
the appellate trial, until a final judgment is announced. Therefore, it is necessary to determine if
the standard for fitness to plead and stand trial is the same during the appeals process as the trial
process at the ECCC, or if a less strict, more flexible standard of fitness can be appropriate.
A. Khmer Rouge
Prior to the Khmer Rouge takeover, Cambodia had been ravaged by brutal civil war
bombing and turmoil and was caught in the chaos of the U.S.-Vietnam conflict.6 The Khmer
Rouge took power in April 1975 and was overthrown in January 1979.7 This regime ultimately
led to the Cambodian genocide, mass executions, extreme national famine, and forced labor.8
The following leaders of the Khmer Rouge were identified by the ECCC and were indicted under
ECCC jurisdiction: Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, and Ieng Thirith.9 Of these accused,
both Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan have recently been convicted at the trial level and
sentenced to life imprisonment.10 Ieng Thirith was found unfit to stand trial.11

5

Case 002/01 Judgment, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC (7 August 2014) [reproduced on
accompanying flash drive at number 2].
6

Jaya Ramji and Beth Van Shaack, Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: Prosecuting Mass
Violence Before the Cambodian Courts, 13 (2005) [reproduced in part on accompanying flash
drive at number 20].
7

Id.

“Introduction,” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc/introduction [http://perma.cc/LN9X-FSR4].
8

9

Closing Order, 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, 402 (15 September 2014) [reproduced on
accompanying flash drive at number 3].
10

Case 002/001 Judgment, 622 (2014).
9

B. Formation of the ECCC
On December 18, 2002, nearly thirty years after the devastation of the Democratic
Kampuchea, the United Nations (“UN”) General Assembly adopted resolution 57/228 that
recalled the serious violations of the Khmer Rouge regime.12 This resolution urges the Secretary
General of the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia to solidify and draft an Agreement
that would outline the role of the Extraordinary Chambers, which would operate within
Cambodian law, to prosecute crimes committed during the Democratic Kampuchea.13 The UN
General Assembly soon thereafter accepted the proposed Agreement, and thus the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were established.14 As the official Agreement between the
UN and the Royal Courts of Cambodia states, the ECCC was created for the purpose of
prosecuting “senior leaders of the Democratic Kampuchea and those who are most responsible
for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law
and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during
the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.”15 Since the passage of the Agreement, the

Decision on Ieng Thirith’s Fitness to Stand Trial, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC (17 November
2011) [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number 6].
11

12

G.A. Res. 109(b), UN GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (February 2003).
[reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number 12].
13

Id.

14

G.A. Res. 109(b), UN GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228/B (May 2003).
[reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number 13].
15

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, 57/228 (18 December 2002) [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number
11].
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ECCC has become fully functioning and has indicted and convicted several senior leaders of the
Democratic Kampuchea.
C. Situation now at the ECCC
Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan have both been convicted at the trial level.
During the trial process, both of the accused filed written submissions with the Chamber
for a report on fitness to stand trial.16 The Chamber assigned three different medical experts to
examine each accused individually; and then collectively, the experts were to issue a report on
each of the accused.17 From these reports, the Chamber concluded that both Nuon Chea and
Khieu Samphan were fit to stand trial.18 Even though both of these accused were convicted at the
trial level and an appeal verdict will soon be delivered, there is a question of whether either of
the accused’s medical conditions may deteriorate over this time. This presents an interesting
procedural question of whether the standard that the Chamber used on the trial level for
determining fitness to plead will be the same on the appellate level, or if the standard will be one
of a lesser degree.
III. Legal Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
The Agreement between UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia outlines
the scope of the ECCC’s jurisdiction.
According to Article 9 of the Agreement,
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be the
crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
16

Decision on Fitness of the Accused Khieu Samphan to Stand Trial, at ¶ 1 (2014).

17

Id.

18

Id. at ¶ 2; and Decision on Fitness of Nuon Chea to Stand Trial, at ¶ 2 (2014).

11

and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, crimes against humanity as
defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and such other crimes as
defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary
Chamber promulgated on 10 August 2001.19
According to Article 12, the criminal procedure used at the ECCC to try the abovementioned crimes must be in accordance with Cambodian law.20 Where there seems to be
inconsistency in the rule or the application of the rule, the Court can look at the procedural rules
from outside jurisdictions and to rules established at the international level.21 In light of Article
12, the following discussion will provide both a view of the standard for fitness to plead within
the Cambodian jurisdiction and within other civil law jurisdictions. This paper will also present a
discussion of how customary international law seems to be forming on this subject.
B. Standard of Fitness at Trial Level
i.

The ECCC has previously outlined the standard for fitness to plead at the
trial level.

In order for an accused to be found fit to stand trial, he must be “capable of meaningful
participation which allows him to exercise his fair trial rights.”22 The accused must be able to
exercise these rights to an extent that he is “able to participate effectively in his trial and has an
understanding of the essentials of the proceedings.”23 To determine if the accused meets this
threshold test, the Chamber can seek medical expert opinion, make its own observations of the

19

Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia, at Art. 9.

20

Id. at Art. 12.

21

Id.

22

Decision on Fitness of the Accused Khieu Samphan, at ¶ 6 (2014).

23

Id.

12

accused’s presence, and acknowledge certain pre-existing medical conditions.24 The Chamber
can also look to the accused’s capacity to understand the nature or essence of the charges, the
general consequence of the proceedings, the details of the evidence, and even whether or not the
accused still has the overall ability to instruct his lawyers and even to testify on his own behalf. 25
ii.

Ieng Thirith

Along with several other leaders of the Democratic Kampuchea, Ieng Thirith was also
indicted for crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and
genocide.26 Between her indictment and the start of her trial, she was found unfit to stand trial,
and the Trial Chamber ordered her to be released.27 The medical reports confirmed that the
accused was suffering from the medical condition dementia.28 The Supreme Court Chamber
overturned the order for release, and ordered that a new assessment of her fitness to stand trial to
be conducted.29 The Chamber found that she was still unfit to stand trial.30 The Supreme Court
Chamber then issued a “regime of judicial supervision.”31 With this supervision, the Chamber

24

Decision on Fitness of the Accused Khieu Samphan, at ¶ 6 (2014).

25

Id.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, “Ieng Thirith,”
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/ieng-thirith [http://perma.cc/8A8X-NBDE].
26

Immediate Appeal Against Decision on Reassessment of Accused Ieng Thirith’s Fitness to
Stand Trial Following the Supreme Court Chamber Decision of 13 December 2011, 002/19-092007-ECCC/SC(16), ¶ 2 (2011). [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number 8].
27

28

Termination of the Proceedings Against the Accused Ieng Thirith, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC,
¶ 3 (2015). [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number 10].
29

30

31

See Immediate Appeal Against Decision on Reassessment, at ¶ 2 (2012).
Id.
Id. at ¶ 3.
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ordered that Ieng Thirith would be subject to a new medical examination every six-months to
determine if she was still considered unfit to stand trial.32 The accused has since died on August
22, 2015.33 Following her death, the Chamber terminated all charges against Ieng Thirith
pursuant to the Internal Rules.34
What are the implications of the termination of proceedings against
Ieng Thirith on the potentiality of pending cases?
If any of the accused file to have their fitness re-examined, the question remains if the
Supreme Court Chamber will then issue a reassessment of the accused’s fitness, just as it did in
Ieng Thirith’s situation. In her situation, the same fitness standard was used on reassessment as
in the initial assessment.35 Also, when Ieng Thirith was found unfit to stand trial, she was placed
into judicial supervision.36
The accused currently awaiting appeal at the ECCC should not be held to the same
standard. Unlike Ieng Thirith’s case, the ECCC actually received a conviction for both Khieu
Samphan and Nuon Chea at the trial level. Ieng Thirith’s case never reached a conviction,
because she was found unfit to plead prior to an official and final ruling.37 Also, even though
Ieng Thirith was found unfit to plead, she was still placed under judicial supervision and

32

Immediate Appeal Against Decision on Reassessment, at ¶ 17(6) (2012).

33

ECCC Press Release: Accused Person Ieng Thirith Dies (22 August 2015) [reproduced on
accompanying flash drive at number 1].
34

ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 23 bis. (6) (2015) [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at
number 7].
35

Immediate Appeal Against Decision on Reassessment (2012).

36

Id. at ¶ 3.

37

Id. at ¶ 19.
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subjected to medical examinations every six months, to determine if at any point she would
become fit to stand trial.38 Because the Chamber has already convicted the two accused men that
are currently awaiting appeal, the Chamber should consider using a different standard of fitness
at the appellate level.
C. Standard of Fitness on Appeal
Cambodian Law does not provide a standard for fitness to stand trial on
the appellate level.
Because of the jurisdictional constraints placed on the ECCC, the Chamber must first
look to local Cambodian law to determine if there is a specified standard for fitness. The Code of
Criminal Procedure for the Kingdom of Cambodia does not provide a standard that the ECCC
could follow when determining if the accused is fit to stand trial.39 Because Cambodian law does
not designate a specific standard, the Chamber is permitted to look towards procedural rules that
have been established at over regional jurisdiction and customs at the international level.40
D. International Standards
i. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has provided a
primer for other international criminal courts when looking at the standard for fitness to stand
trial. The ICTY held that the test for fitness to stand trial is not the same as defining if the

38

Immediate Appeal Against Decision on Reassessment (2012), at ¶ 3.

39

The Code of Criminal Procedure for the Kingdom of Cambodia, Khmer-English Translation
(September 2008) [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number 18].
40

Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia, at Art. 12.
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accused has a mental or physical disorder.41 The ICTY first determined that the threshold test for
fitness is whether the accused has the capacity to effectively exercise his rights at “such a level
that it is possible for the accused to participate in the proceedings and to … make his defense.”42
In the case of Prosecutor v. Strugar, the ICTY furthered this standard by providing a more indepth approach to determining fitness to stand trial.
In Strugar, the ICTY held that the accused must have the “overall capacity allowing for a
meaningful participation in the trial,” and also the accused must have “the capacity to reasonably
pursue his rights” (emphasis added).43 In this case, the accused’s medical examination revealed
that he was suffering from multiple physical and mental disorders, including “recurrent
depression, vascular dementia, residual posttraumatic stress disorder, vertebrobasilar
insufficiency, [and] chronic renal failure.”44 The accused contended that as a result of all of these
conditions overlapping, his “cognitive abilities had deteriorated his judgment [sic] thinking,
general processing of information, as well as in impaired memory, learning, attention and
concentration.”45 While the court held that an accused’s fitness must be considered in light of the
combination of his or her illnesses, the threshold test is whether or not the accused has an
“overall capacity allowing for meaningful participation in the trial.”46 In the end, the ICTY found

41

Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-A, 28 (2008) [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at
number 16].
Prosecutor v. Kovačević, IT/01-42/2, ¶ 27 (2006). [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at
number 15].
42

43

Strugar, at 23 and 28 (2008).

44

Id. at 12.

45

Strugar, at 13 (2008).

46

Id. at 28.
16

that Strugar was fit to stand trial.47 First, the court determined that it was undisputed by either
party that Strugar understood the nature of the charges he was facing. Secondly, the court found
that it was reasonable to conclude that Strugar did possess capacity to “understand the course of
the proceedings and the details of the evidence.”48 To determine this, the court made its own
observations about the accused’s behavior, especially Strugar’s behavior in light of his
explanations and concerns that he made in regards to his medical report.49 Thirdly, the court
found that the accused reasonably had the capacity to testify at trial.50 Finally, the court
concluded that Strugar was able to reasonably instruct his counsel, by looking at how Strugar had
in fact already been instructing his counsel about information relating to the medical report.51
The analysis set forth in the Strugar opinion provides a foundational basis for assessing
the fitness standard on the appellate level. Even though the ICTY Appeals Chamber was
primarily focused on whether the trial court erred when issuing its judgment.52 The ECCC can
apply this standard similarly. By taking similar factors under consideration to those that the
ICTY considered, the ECCC will seemingly be using a more flexible standard than it had already

47

Strugar, at 29 (2008).

48

Id.

49

Id.

Id. at 28. Here, the court once again made observations of Strugar’s participation in
recollecting events and statements made to his medical examiners.
50

51

Id. at 30.

52

Id.

17

applied, when determining an accused’s fitness to plead at the trial level. But even though this
standard may seem lesser, it has been fully upheld by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.53
ii. Many other national courts seem to be using a standard similar to
that standard defined in Strugar, or a standard otherwise more
flexible than that employed at the ECCC.
Germany
In recent years, German national courts have reprised the interest in bringing former
alleged Nazis to justice. This reprisal has led to many German courts leaning towards a more
flexible standard of fitness at both the trial and appellate levels.
In the past decade alone, several alleged Nazis have since been indicted and were later
were found fit to stand trial as late as 2009.54 Heinrich Boere, for example, was 88 years old at
the time of his indictment.55 Boere had confessed to willingly joining the Nederlaandsche-SS in
1942, and confessed to taking part in espionage to serve the Nazi regime.56 While Boere was
found unfit to plead at the trial level due to a pre-existing heart condition, the German Higher
Regional Court of Appeal in Cologne reversed this decision.57 While the official appellate
decision is unavailable in English, Swoboda’s article provides that “old age and infirmity [are]

53

Strugar, at 30 (2008).

Pizzo, Not Guilty – “But Not Innocent: An Analysis of the Acquittal of John Demjanjuk and
its Impact on the Nazi War Crimes Trials,” Boston College International and Comparative Law
Review, Vol. 18, Issue 1, Art. 4. [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number 25].
54

Swoboda, “Paying the Debts – Late Nazi Trials before German Courts,” Journal of
International Criminal Justice, Oxford Journals (2010) [reproduced on accompanying flash drive
at number 26].
55

56

Id. at 17.

57

Swoboda, at 17.

18

only taken into account…so that the court may grant conditional early release.”58 This statement
leads the reader to infer that the appellate court did not necessarily take “old age and infirmity”
into account when appealing the trial court’s decision on fitness.
Furthering this idea, a German trial court also indicted another accused Nazi in 2009.59
John Demjanjuk, 89 years old at the time of his indictment, was deported from the United States
to Germany to stand trial.60 In 2009, Demjanjuk was found fit to stand trial.61 The court looks to
many different factors in order to determine if the accused to fit to stand trial. First, the court
takes into consideration the accused’s health.62 During the course of his fitness hearings,
Demjanjuk’s health seemed to be deteriorating rapidly.63 Medical examiners requested that
Demjanjuk only be required to spend two, 90-minute-sessions in court daily.64 Also during
Demjanjuk’s fitness hearing, his son (“Demjanjuk Jr.”) officially reported to the Associated
Press that his father was dying of “incurable leukemic bone marrow disease.”65 Also, at one

58

Swoboda. at 19.

59

Beck, Does Age Prevent Punishment? The Struggles of the German Juridical System with
Alleged Nazi Criminals: Commentary on the Criminal Proceedings Against John Demjanjuk and
Heinrich Boere, 11 German L.J. 347 (2010). [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at
number 22].
60

Id.

“Demjanjuk deemed 'fit to stand trial,'” The Jerusalem Post (3 July 2009). Available at
http://www.jpost.com/International/Demjanjuk-deemed-fit-to-stand-trial [http://perma.cc/JW2SGWFM].
61

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.
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point during the hearings, the proceedings were suspended for a brief session because Demjanjuk
was “too ill to attend.”66 While there is no official English opinion of the case that would help
determine why exactly Demjanjuk was found fit to plead given the circumstances, Swoboda’s
above argument is furthered by this decision, implying that “old age and infirmity” were not
substantially taken into account when determining the accused’s fitness.
Both the Boere case and Demjanjuk are examples of accused who are approximately the
same ages as the two accused that are awaiting appeal in the ECCC, and in similar health
situations. In these cases, German courts seem to be applying a less strict standard of fitness, at
least in cases of former war criminals. While no standard is explicitly stated, German national
courts seem to be using a more flexible standard of fitness, both at the trial level and the
appellate level, by not necessarily placing a substantial weight on the issues of old age and
infirmity.
United Kingdom and Chile
The Chilean courts used a similar standard to that of the ICTY, when it found Augusto
Pinochet mentally fit to stand trial, thus denouncing a determination to the contrary by the United
Kingdom’s House of Lords.67 68 Pinochet was first found unfit by the British House of Lords,
who noted his extensive brain injuries and loss in memory.69 Pinochet was eventually released,
and later was indicted by Chile courts. The Chilean court applied the standard of “whether or not

66

Beck, at 353.

67

See Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 438 (2000), paraphrasing a Spanishonly press release article [reproduced on accompanying flash drive at number 24].
68

The House of Lords is the highest court in the United Kingdom. Byers, 426.

69

Id.

20

Pinochet would be capable of following the process of a trial so as to instruct his lawyers.”70 The
court, however, clarifies that simply proving a mental illness or memory loss is not the threshold
factor.71 Similar to the ICTY’s analysis in Strugar, the Chilean judge presiding over Pinochet’s
case looked to several different factors when conducting her analysis of whether Pinochet should
be found fit to stand trial.72 Not only did the judge review Pinochet’s newly released medical
records, but she also used her own observations of Pinochet’s behavior.73 In 2003, Pinochet
provided an interview for a Spanish television network based in the United States.74 In that
interview, the judge noted that Pinochet “appeared lucid and defiant” and was very clearly
making declarations about his past behavior.75 Ultimately, the judge in this case took all these
factors into consideration when determining Pinochet fit to stand trial, effectively denouncing the
previous House of Lords ruling.76
Cayman Islands
In one specific case from the Cayman Islands, a less strict standard of fitness seems to
have been used. At the trial level, the court looked to a psychiatric evaluation to determine that

70

Beck, at 353.

Rohter, “Chilean Judge Says Pinochet is Fit for Trial,” New York Times (14 Dec. 2004). At
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/14/world/americas/chilean-judge-says-pinochet-is-fit-fortrial.html. [perma link could not be created for this file].
71

72

Rohter, 14 Dec. 2004.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.; quoting television interview: “Everything I did, I would do again.”

76

Byers, at 438 (2000).

21

the accused was not fit to stand trial.77 Even though the case did not officially go through an
appeals process, the accused continued to undergo psychiatric evaluations until he was
sentenced, even after the court’s decision.78 From one of these evaluations, the examining
psychiatrist found that the accused had “appeared to have developed more pronounced symptoms
of paranoia.”79 Even though these subsequent evaluations point to the accused suffering from
acute psychological disorders, the court still declared him fit to stand trial and proceeded with his
sentencing, noting the idea that deteriorated personality orders or deteriorated mental status is not
enough to exclusively decide the accused’s fitness.80
South Africa
According to the South African Criminal Procedure Act, courts must look at mental
illness or mental defect when determining if the accused can be found fit to plead.81 The mental
status of the accused must be such that it renders the accused “incapable of appreciating the
wrongfulness of his or her act or omission.”82 The accused must be incapable of acting with an
appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or her actions.83 This standard seems to be a much more
broad standard than that the ECCC applied at the trial level. Instead of using a standard of
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“meaningful participation,” South African courts seem to focus more on the severity of the
accused’s mental status when determining fitness, versus how much the accused will be able to
participate in the proceedings. The standard set forth in the South African Criminal Procedure
Act seems to require a much more serious mental debility than the standard used at the trial level
at the ECCC.
Australia
According to the Australian Criminal Law Consolidation on Mental Impairment, there
are several factors that Australian courts must take into consideration when determining if the
accused is fit to stand trial.84 According to this Australian standard, the accused can be found
unfit to stand trial if the accused’s “mental processes are so disordered or impaired” that the he
or she is unable to
(1) Understand, or rationally respond to, the accusations against him or her;
(2) Exercise his or her procedural rights;85 or
(3) Understand the general nature of the proceedings, or “to follow evidence.”86
In comparison to the standard expressed at the trial level of the ECCC, this standard in
the Australian Criminal Law Consolidation seems to be less strict. Also, in Australian courts,
when an accused person is deemed unfit to stand trial, the accused will then be taken under
judicial supervision indefinitely, much like the judicial supervision furnished by the ECCC.87 By
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using wordings such as rationally and to generally understand, these phrases indicate that the
accused need only to be able to generally comprehend the trial itself. Whereas, the “meaningful
participation” standard seems to imply a heightened sense of self-awareness that is expressly not
required of Australian courts.
Conclusion on national standards
Although there does not seem to be any one consistent and cohesive standard when
determining the fitness to stand trial, many courts have been applying a more flexible standard
both at the trial level and on appeal than the standard used at the ECCC trial level. It is arguable
that all of these courts, when aggregated together, have created an international custom of using
a more flexible standard. In many of the aforementioned cases, the accused in question were
similarly situated to the accused that are currently awaiting an appeal verdict at the ECCC.
Therefore, the Supreme Court Chamber should not be strictly bound to the exact same
“meaningful participation” standard used at the trial level. Instead, the Chamber should employ a
more flexible standard for fitness.
IV.

Policy Reasons for arguing for a less strict, more flexible standard of fitness to
plead.
In addition to the above analysis permitting the ECCC to use a more flexible standard of

fitness, there are also many ethical arguments for why the Supreme Court Chamber should use a
lower standard for fitness. First, as argued by Dinah PoKempner, the ECCC is a way to help
transition Cambodia into what she calls a “culture of accountability.”88 After the atrocities that
occurred in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979, holding the leaders of the Democratic
Kampuchea publically responsible for their actions is the first real step towards bettering the
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Cambodian state.89 Along with cultural accountability, the ECCC was formed for the purpose of
pursuing both justice and “national reconciliation, stability, peace and security.”90 These were
ideas not only of legitimate concern to the people and government of Cambodia, but also to the
United Nations General Assembly.91 Using a more flexible standard of fitness would not only be
procedurally accepted and conforming to international law, but it was also be a practice that
would help further the goals of the ECCC, and help lead to the reconstruction of Cambodian
faith in the international legal community.
V.

There is Another Argument the ECCC could Make Based on the Rome Statute.
While there are both procedural and policy reasons for using a more flexible standard of

fitness to plead, there is perhaps a different avenue that the Chamber could follow. The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that the appellate chamber is permitted to
deliver its judgment in the absence of the person, acquitted or convicted.92 This presents another
interesting question to the ECCC. If the ECCC were to apply this same standard, even if one of
the accused were to be found unfit to stand trial, the Chamber could still issue its judgment
against the accused, treating the accused as merely legally absent.93 While there is a question as
to whether an “in absentia” judgment is actually enforceable, there would at least be a final
judgment for the record. If the ECCC decided to take this route, rather than argue for a similar or
lower fitness standard, the Chamber would have to look more towards policy, rather than
89
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procedural reasoning, and determine whether issuing a non-enforceable judgment would still be
a positive step toward justice and national reconciliation.
VI.

Conclusion
For all of the above-discussed reasons, the ECCC should be able to avoid having the

convictions of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan vacated, even if their fitness declines during the
appeals process. First, the ECCC should use a less strict, more flexible standard of fitness on
appeal than that which was used at the trial level. The Strugar opinion from the ICTY provides a
standard that is more appropriate than the “meaningful participation” standard used by the
ECCC. If the ECCC were to use a more flexible standard, it would be well within the constraints
of international jurisprudence. In addition to this ICTY opinion, the recent evolution of
customary international law leans towards a more flexible standard of fitness. And finally,
reasons of policy and ethics support recording long-awaited judgments against perpetrators of
atrocities such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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